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I A GREED TO W HAT ?: P ROTECTING C ONSUMERS FROM U NFAIR
P RACTICES IN B INDING C ONSUMER A RBITRATION
Laura Magnotta *

I.

INTRODUCTION

July 1, 2011 Maryland House Bill 442 was enacted into law. 1 The Act, entitled
Consumer Protection –Transparency in Consumer Arbitrations Act, is aimed at protecting
consumers who become parties to binding consumer arbitration, particularly through adhesion. 2
The Act requires that specified arbitration organizations collect, publish and make available
information relating to binding consumer arbitration. 3 Additionally, the Act lays out specific
guidelines for how and when the information is to be published. 4 Failure to comply with the
requirements of the Act can result in the arbitration agreement being deemed unconscionable or
unenforceable, but may not be “the sole reason to refuse to enforce an award made in consumer
arbitration.” 5 A prior attempt at similarly protecting consumers’ interest in binding arbitration
was introduced in the Maryland House of Delegates in 2010, was passed out of the House, but
died in the Senate coming up one vote shy of passage in the Senate Finance Committee. 6 This
article will discuss specific aspects of the new law, place the law within the context of other
attempts to protect consumers in binding arbitration, and discuss the practical implications of the
law.

On

II.

CONSUMER
PROTECTION
ARBITRATIONS ACT

–

TRANSPARENCY

IN

CONSUMER

The Consumer Protection –Transparency in Consumer Arbitration Act applies “to an
arbitration organization that performs an arbitration activity related to 50 or more consumer
arbitrations during a five-year period.” 7 As defined by the Act, “arbitration activity” includes
participation in any one or more aspects of arbitration including “initiation, conduct, sponsorship,
or administration of, or the appointment of an arbitrator.” 8 Additionally, consumer arbitration is
defined as “binding arbitration conducted in accordance with a consumer arbitration agreement.” 9
*
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1
See H.B. 442, 428th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2011) (enacted) (codified at MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 14-39013905 (West 2011)). H.B. 442 was crossfiled with S.B. 309 (See S.B. 309, 428th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2011) (enacted)
(codified at MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 14-3901 to -3905 (West 2011))).
2
See Consumer Protection—Transparency in Consumer Arbitration Act, MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 143901-3905 (West 2011).
3
See id.
4
See id.
5
See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3905(b)(1)-(2) (West 2011).
6
See H.B. 379, 427th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2010).
7
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3902 (West 2011).
8
Id. § 14-3901(b).
9
Id. § 14-3901(e)(1).
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This does not include binding arbitration resulting from an agreement for property insurance,
casualty insurance or surety insurance; arbitration according to “arbitration rules adopted by a
securities self-regulatory organization and approved by the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission”; or consumer arbitration involving an institution licensed by the Department of
Health and Mental Hygiene if the agreement to arbitrate is not a mandated condition for
admission into the institution. 10

A. Required Information
Arbitration organizations that are subject to the Act are required to “collect, publish, and
make available to the public…information regarding each consumer arbitration for which it
performed an arbitration activity during the preceding five-year period.” 11 The information
required to be published includes: the name of the non-consumer party; whether the dispute
involved goods, services, real property or credit; the type of claim or cause of action; which party
prevailed; “the number of times during reporting period that the non-consumer party has been a
party in a consumer arbitration for which the arbitration organization performed an arbitration
activity”; the name of the attorney representing the consumer party; “the date the arbitration
organization received the demand for the consumer arbitration, the date the arbitrator was
appointed, and the date of disposition by the arbitrator or arbitration organization”; the type of
disposition of the dispute; the amount of the claim, award or any other relief granted; the name of
the arbitrator, their fee and the percentage of the arbitrator’s fee allocated to each party; and the
address of where the consumer arbitration was conducted. 12

B.

Publication Method

The required information is to “be reported beginning on the first day of the month
following the month an arbitration organization becomes subject to this [Act]” and “shall be
updated at least quarterly thereafter.” 13 More specifically, to be made sufficiently available to the
public, the required information shall be published in a “computer-searchable format that is
accessible at the Internet Web site of the arbitration organization and may be downloaded without
a fee.” 14 The information shall also be made available in writing on request “at a fee that does
not exceed the actual cost to the arbitration organization of copying the information.” 15

C. Uses for Information/Failure to Comply
The requirement for arbitration organizations to collect information regarding consumer
arbitration can affect organizations in two main ways. First, the information provided by the
arbitration organization as required by the Act “may be considered in determining whether a

10

See id. § 14-3901(e)(2)(i)-(iii).
Id. § 14-3903(a).
12
See id. § 14-3903(a)(1)-(11).
13
Id. § 14-3903(b)(1).
14
Id. § 14-3903(c).
15
Id.
11
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consumer arbitration agreement is unconscionable or otherwise unenforceable under the law.” 16
Second, while an arbitration organization’s failure to comply with the provisions of the Act “may
not be the sole reason to refuse to enforce an award made in a consumer arbitration,” it “may be
considered as a factor in determining whether a consumer arbitration agreement is
unconscionable or otherwise unenforceable under the law.” 17
An arbitration organization’s failure to comply with the Act allows “a consumer or the
Attorney General [to] seek an injunction to prohibit an arbitration organization that has engaged
in or is engaging in a violation of §14-3903…from continuing or engaging in the violation.”18 If
the court issues an injunction or the arbitration organization voluntarily complies with §14-3903
after the action is filed, the organization is liable to the person bringing the action for an
injunction for the person’s reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.19

D. Liability for Reporting
To encourage reporting of required information, the Act includes a provision that shields
arbitration organizations from liability for reporting the information. 20 Under the Act, “[a]n
arbitration organization is not liable for collecting, publishing, or distributing the information
required under [the Act].” 21 This provision precludes a party whose information was published as
required by the Act from suing the publishing arbitration organization.

III.

ANALYSIS

The need to protect consumers in binding arbitration is not a new concept. Several cases
and specific situations throughout the United States have highlighted the need for consumer
protection in binding consumer arbitration particularly where the arbitration agreement is
adhesionary. Issues arise as a result of how consumers, who are often forced into arbitrating their
claims, are treated during the process. Without transparency in the consumer arbitration process,
consumers are typically faced with a foreign process against an entity that has participated in the
process numerous times and has the benefit of familiarity with the process, familiarity with the
arbitrator(s) or arbitration organization, and institutional memory and resources.
The basis for issues arising out of binding consumer arbitration concerns the adhesionary
nature of the arbitration agreements where consumers can either agree to the arbitration
agreement or forego the transaction altogether. The fact that the contract is adhesionary does not
make it per se unconscionable or unenforceable. The Supreme Court in AT&T Mobility v.
Concepcion mentioned that adhesionary contracts remain enforceable because of the proliferation
of their use. 22 The problems with these types of adhesionary arbitration agreements arise when
16

Id. § 14-3904.
Id. § 14-3905(b).
18
Id. § 14-3905(c)(1).
19
See id. § 14-3905(c)(2).
20
See id. § 14-3905(a).
21
Id.
17

22

See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 (2011) (“[T]he times in which
consumer contracts were anything other than adhesive are long past.”).
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either the consumer does not know that they have entered into an agreement to arbitrate their
disputes, or, if they are aware of the agreement to arbitrate, they either 1) do not expect to need it,
2) do not fully understand the ramifications, or 3) value the benefits of the product or service over
the costs of arbitration. This lack of knowledge on the part of the consumer allows nonconsumers to navigate a system with which they are familiar in a way that is potentially harmful
and unfair to the consumer.
This issue was more specifically addressed in Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group,
Inc. In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennard noted the potential for unfairness in binding
consumer arbitration where contracts are adhesionary. 23 This unfairness arises when businesses
and/or arbitrators in binding consumer arbitration become repeat players in the arbitration system
causing “arbitrators [to] consciously or unconsciously bias their decisions in favor of an
organization or industry that hires them regularly as an arbitrator.” 24 While the majority of the
court in Engalla did not find that Permanente Medical Group’s method of selecting arbitrations
made the contract to arbitrate unconscionable, they did find that Permanente’s practices were
contrary to those of reputable neutral, third party arbitration organizations. 25 Subsequently, the
California Supreme Court affirmed the need for neutral arbitrators in Armendariz v. Foundation
Health Psychcare Services, Inc. 26

To prevent the possibility of non-consumer parties taking advantage of the
binding consumer arbitration process at the cost of the consumer, it is essential that
consumer arbitration is made fair through the use of neutral and impartial arbitrators.
Arbitration institutions have taken affirmative steps towards ensuring fairness and
transparency in consumer arbitration by implementing protocols and other regulations
requiring arbitrator neutrality. 27 In 1997, the National Consumer Disputes Advisory
Committee promulgated recommendations for ensuring fairness in consumer arbitration
entitled Due Process Protocol for the Mediation and Arbitration of Consumer Disputes,
which were later adopted by the American Arbitration Association. 28 Principle three of
the protocol addresses “Independent and Impartial Neutrals and; Independent
Administration.” The principle entitles all parties to arbitration procedures administered
by an independent ADR institution and overseen by an independent and impartial
23

See Engalla v. Permanente Med. Grp., Inc., 938 P.2d 903, 926-927, 15 Cal. 4th 951, 987-988 (Cal.
1997) (Kennard, J., concurring) (“Finally, it is worth noting that new possibilities for unfairness arise as
arbitration ventures beyond the world of merchant-to-merchant disputes in which it was conceived into the
world of consumer transactions….”).
24

Id. at 927.

25

See id. at 925 (majority opinion).
See Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 682 (Cal. 2000) (citing Cole v.
Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1997)) (A mandatory employment arbitration
agreement (similar to the mandatory consumer arbitration contract here) is lawful if it “(1) provides for
neutral arbitrators, (2) provides for more than minimal discovery, (3) requires a written award, (4) provides
for all of the types of relief that would otherwise be available in court, and (5) does not require employees
to pay either unreasonable costs or any arbitrators' fees or expenses as a condition of access to the
arbitration forum. Thus, an employee who is made to use arbitration as a condition of employment
effectively may vindicate his or her statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum.”).
26

27

See generally AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL (1998) (a series of
principles aimed at ensuring a fair process in consumer dispute resolution).
28
See id., Introduction: Genesis of the Advisory Committee.
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neutral. 29 Additionally, the principle also requires equality between consumer and nonconsumer in selecting a neutral and that the chosen neutral discloses “any circumstance
likely to affect impartiality…” 30
Specific instances of conflicts of interest between arbitration organizations and nonconsumer parties to consumer arbitration influenced the Maryland legislature’s decision to enact a
law aimed at protecting the consumer. 31 For example, in 2009, the Minnesota Attorney General
sued the National Arbitration Forum (Forum) alleging that the Forum generated revenue by
convincing creditors to include mandatory arbitration clauses and appoint the Forum as the
arbitrator. 32 The Attorney General also alleged that the Forum, the country’s largest provider of
debt collection arbitration, financially affiliated itself with Mann Bracken, one of the country’s
largest debt collectors. 33 The Mann Bracken law firm, based in Maryland before its collapse in
2010, employed a debt-collection process that was inherently biased against consumers. 34 Mann
Bracken took cases to the Forum which was “connected to Mann Bracken through a common
ownership structure,” where the arbitrators would almost always find in Mann Bracken’s favor. 35
These actions, it was alleged, hid from consumers the fraudulent nature of these associations and
the bias of their arbitrators. 36 The issue was settled with an agreement that the Forum cease to
arbitrate credit card debt and other consumer collection disputes. 37
The Maryland legislature was also influenced by a July 2010 Federal Trade Commission
Report titled Repairing a Broken System: Protecting Consumers in Debt Collection Litigation
and Arbitration. 38 To prevent bias and unfairness in binding arbitration, the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) recommended measures to increase transparency and fairness in the
arbitration process. The measures included drafting contracts so consumers are aware of their
choice to arbitrate, eliminating bias in the arbitration process and conducting arbitration so that
consumers will be more likely to participate.39 The FTC recommended that these measures be
adopted by Congress to create a nationwide system requiring that debt collection arbitration
decisions be reported and made public. Congress has yet to follow through and pass such
legislation, leaving the states to protect their citizens. In addition to Maryland, California and the
District of Columbia have enacted arbitration disclosure laws similar to those recommended by
the FTC. 40
In an attempt to protect consumers who are not participating in arbitration with an
arbitration organization such as AAA and JAMS who have consumer protection safeguards in
29

See id., Principle 3.
See id., Principle 3.5. Circumstances that might affect impartiality include: any bias or financial or personal
interest which might affect the result of the ADR proceeding; or any past or present relationship or experience with the
parties or their representatives, including past ADR experiences.
31
See S.B. 309 Fiscal and Policy Note: Consumer Protection - Transparency in Consumer Arbitrations Act,
Dept. Legis. Servs., 428th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2011).
32
See Complaint at 2, Minnesota v. Nat’l Arb. Forum, No. 27CV0918550 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 2009) (settled out of
court) [hereinafter “Complaint”].
33
See id.
34
See Jamie Smith Hopkins & Andrea K. Walker, After the Fall: Collapse of Mann Bracken, One of the LargestDebt Collector Law Firms, Lifts the Veil of an ‘Oppressive’ Industry, BALTIMORE SUN, Mar. 21, 2010, at 1C.
35
See id.
36
See Complaint, supra note 32.
37
See Firm Agrees to End Role in Arbitrating Card Debt, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2009, at B8.
38
See S.B. 309 Fiscal and Policy Note, supra note 31.
39
See S.B. 309 Fiscal and Policy Note, supra note 31.
40
See S.B. 309 Fiscal and Policy Note, supra note 31.
30
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place, the Maryland General Assembly enacted the Consumer Protection –Transparency in
Consumer Arbitrations Act in an attempt to ensure fairness in binding consumer arbitration in all
consumer arbitrations taking place in Maryland. As introduced by Delegate Samuel Rosenberg in
the Maryland House of Delegates, House Bill 442 was aimed at equipping consumers with the
tools to determine whether or not the arbitrator(s) hearing their case are neutral and to allow
consumers to make an informed decision when choosing arbitrators. 41 Proponents of the bill
commented that, unlike in court, there is no way to discover information about arbitrators and
their decisions because that information is kept secret. 42 The Act solves this problem by
requiring that information about arbitrators and their decisions are published, thereby uncovering
information about arbitration organizations and increasing transparency.
Opponents of the bill argued that the bill could have negative effects on the consumers it
is intended to protect. First, by requiring publication of arbitration decisions, the arbitration
process becomes more like a typical courtroom legal proceeding, which is what the parties had
contracted to avoid. 43 Second, publication of awards could invite burdensome and complicated
discovery requests in subsequent disputes that could significantly increase the cost and time for
arbitration, which is adverse to the central purpose of choosing arbitration. 44 Specific industries
also had concerns with the need for confidentially in highly regulated industries such as
healthcare. 45
Practically speaking, the Act will allow consumers who become involved in consumer
arbitration to examine information about arbitrators and their past decisions before choosing the
arbitrator that will hear their case. Theoretically, this requirement should keep the arbitrators
honest because arbitrators and arbitration organizations who want to maintain business and
revenue will come to decisions in a fair and transparent way to make themselves more appealing
to the parties for whom they wish to act as arbitrators. Moreover, the requirement opens the
doors of the arbitration process to the consumers who are unfamiliar with how it works. Not only
will this allow consumers to choose arbitrators who have a history of fair decision-making, it will
also give them insight into how the process works.
The requirements may also benefit the state of Maryland by revealing details of
arbitration organizations’ decisions, thereby allowing the state to take action against arbitration
organizations that are biased in favor of non-consumers. As in the case brought against the
Forum by the Attorney General of Minnesota, Maryland may be able to take action against
arbitration organizations who habitually decide in favor of repeat players in an attempt to bolster
their business. This could prevent issues of bias and unfairness from ever reaching the consumer.
The required disclosures may also give the Maryland General Assembly greater insight into the
consumer arbitration industry, allowing them to enact further regulations if necessary.
41
See Hearing on H.B. 442 Before the H. Comm. on Economic Matters, 428th Leg. (Md. 2011) (oral statement of
Delegate
Samuel
Rosenberg,
Sponsor
of
H.B.
442,
at
1:16:30,
available
at
http://mgahouse.maryland.gov/House/Viewer/?peid=790f93a2b9174df299e187ad54255d751d (noting that the purpose
of the bill was to prevent someone who ruled against consumers in an overwhelming number of cases from being the
required arbitrator in mandatory consumer arbitration).
42
See id. (oral statement of Paul Bland at 1:19:00).
43
See id. (oral statement of Robin Schavitz, Representative of Health Facilities Association of Maryland, at
1:36:40).
44
See id. (oral statement of Susan O’Brien, Vice President with Health Facilities Association of Maryland at
1:34:00).
45
See id. (oral statement of Robin Schavitz, Representative of Health Facilities Association of Maryland at
1:35:50) (noting the secretive nature of healthcare decisions and recommending that the provisions of the Act not apply
to long term care facilities).
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The Act is also designed to insulate the reporting arbitration organizations from being
sued by parties whose information is revealed pursuant to the Act. By relieving the arbitration
organization from liability for disclosing information about the parties to arbitration, the Act
protects arbitration organizations from the financial and reputational effects that revealing private
information about the parties for whom they arbitrate may create. 46 This provision may work to
encourage arbitration organizations to disclose the required information rather than risk not
reporting to protect their reputations and prevent lawsuits for breaching confidentiality.
However, issues may arise in implementing this provision where consumer arbitration contracts
include a confidentiality clause that prohibits disclosure of the same information required by the
Act. Where the Act and the language of the contract contradict one another, the courts will likely
need to determine which prevails. Inviting the courts into the arbitration process defeats the
purpose of choosing to enter into arbitration as opposed to bringing the issue before the court.
Once the courts get involved in determining whether the requirements of the Act overcome the
provisions of the contract, issues regarding the parties’ freedom of contract arise. Section 2 of the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) declares that a written agreement to arbitrate in any contract
involving interstate commerce or a maritime transaction “shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.” 47 Additionally, section 4 of the FAA allows a party to such an arbitration agreement to
“petition any United States district court . . . for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in
the manner provided for in such agreement.” 48 If the courts respect the parties’ freedom of
contract as called for in the FAA, all non-consumers will likely include non-disclosure or
confidentiality provisions in their adhesionary arbitration contracts to ensure that their
information is not disclosed under the Act. This would, in effect, destroy any protections the Act
was enacted to create.
The act may also negatively affect arbitration organizations’ willingness to participate in
consumer arbitration. If the organizations find that reporting requirements are too burdensome or
may uncover unsavory details about the organization, they may choose not to participate in
consumer arbitration or purposely fail to disclose the required information and risk the penalties
to protect their reputations. Similarly, arbitration organizations may fear implicating themselves
or revealing too much to the public to such an extent that they leave the business altogether,
reducing competition among arbitration organizations and increasing the price of arbitration. In
addition, the new reporting requirements may also increase the cost of arbitration due to the
increased requirements placed on the organization. While these risks may be a concern to the
arbitration organizations, the benefits that the consumers will experience in the form of increased
transparency, fairness and accountability in binding consumer arbitration outweigh the potential
risks.

IV.

CONCLUSION

With binding and often adhesionary consumer arbitration provisions becoming the norm
in consumer agreements, consumers are often forced to participate in an adjudicatory process
with which they are unfamiliar. As a result, the businesses against whom they are forced to
46

See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW, § 14-3905(a).

47

See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1925).

48

Id. § 4.
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arbitrate are often more advantageously situated because, as repeat players in consumer
arbitration, they are in the position to compel arbitration organizations to find in their favor in
exchange for continued business and revenue. Consumers are left to fend for themselves in a
system that is essentially set up for them to fail. As a result, consumer arbitration has the
potential to become highly unfair to the consumer who has no choice but to participate or forego
the business transaction altogether.
The Consumer Protection –Transparency in Consumer Arbitrations Act was enacted to
prevent these fraudulent and often secretive relationships between the non-consumers and the
arbitration organizations by requiring that the organizations disclose and publish information
about how they decide consumer arbitration cases. This allows consumers to make informed
decisions regarding the appointment of the arbitrator to their cause and ensures neutrality and
fairness in the consumer arbitration process. While the regulations place a greater burden on the
arbitration organization by requiring them to publish information in the specified manner, the
benefits to the consumer and the protection of the reputation of the arbitration process as a whole
can be seen to outweigh the costs to the arbitration organizations.
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